Oklahoma Law Review
Volume 44

Number 4

1-1-1991

Securities: Is "Any Note" Really a "Security"? Supreme Court Says
"No" in Reves
John Scribner

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr
Part of the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John Scribner, Securities: Is "Any Note" Really a "Security"? Supreme Court Says "No" in Reves, 44 OKLA. L.
REV. 765 (1991),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss4/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma
College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact Law-LibraryDigitalCommons@ou.edu.

Securities: Is "Any Note" Really a "Security"?
Supreme Court Says "No" in Reves
I. Introduction
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(collectively, the Securities Acts) begin their definition of a security with
the term "any note." ' A literal reading of the statute might lead one to
believe that any promissory note is a security regardless of the circumstances
giving rise to its generation. Thus, any promissory note would come within
the purview of the Securities Acts.
From a conceptual point of view, treating all promissory notes as securities
raises no particular problems with the registration requirements under the
Securities Acts. The original issuance can normally fall within the private
placement exemption found in section 4(2) of the 1933 Act. 2 Problems arise,
however, with the application of the anti-fraud provisions to consumer or
commercial transactions involving promissory notes. Is the promissory note
given by a consumer in the purchase of a car, refrigerator, or house to be
used by the purchaser for his own private use, a security? Likewise, is the
promissory note given to a bank as evidence of the loan made to a small
business to buy needed equipment or supplies a security?
If so, persons giving such notes should be entitled to avoid the transaction
under Rule lOb-5 3 when they discover the item was fraudulently represented
1. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 states:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires - the term
"security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of
indebtedness, certificates of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights,
any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit,
or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the
value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a
national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988) [hereinafter the 1933 Act]. The
definition of "security" in the Securities Exchange Act is slightly different. In spite of occasional
differences in wording, the definitions of "security" in the two Acts are functionally equivalent.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)10, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)10 (1988) [hereinafter the 1934
Act]. Both the Senate Report and the Supreme Court have recognized this. See S. REP. No.
792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934) ("substantially the same"); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S.
332, 336 (1967) ("virtually identical").
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988). The private placement exemption allows an issuer to sell
unregistered securities to sophisticated investors who are wealthy enough to withstand the loss
of their original investment.
3. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972) [hereinafter Rule lOb-S], promulgated under the 1934
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to them. Similarly, the seller would have a cause of action under section
12(2) of the 1933 Act if the purchaser misrepresented his financial condition
or ability to pay.4
The first section of this note will examine how the courts have dealt with
the "any note" language as a "security" issue. The early cases applied a
plain meaning, literal language approach to statutory interpretation. Under
this approach, adl notes would be treated as securities.
Later, the courts backed away from this literal reading on the grounds
that such an approach extends the scope of the federal acts beyond that
which Congress could have reasonably intended. This more restrictive approach created a wide divergence among the courts of appeals regarding
what tests should be applied for determining when promissory notes are
securities. The United States Supreme Court attempted to resolve this confusion with its recent holding in Reves v. Ernst & Young.' The second part
of this note will analyze Reves and its progeny.
II. The Early Cases
As noted above, most of the early cases which dealt with the issue applied
the plain meaning test and found that all notes were securities. 6 The case
of Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central NationalBank of Jacksonville,7 is a
good example of these early cases. In Lehigh Valley, one bank sold a
participation interest in a loan originated by that bank to another bank.'
When the loan became uncollectible, the purchaser-bank sued the sellerbank under Rule lOb-5 for failure to make a full and accurate disclosure
of all material facts relevant to the participation.
The court analyzed the transaction under the "note" category in the
definition of a "Eecurity" because the borrower gave the seller-bank his
note in exchange for the loan. The seller-bank argued that the 1934 Act

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 73j(b) (1988). Rule lob-5 makes it unlawful for any person to (a) employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud or (b) make any untrue statement of material fact
or to omit to state a material fact or (c) engage in any act which would operate as a fraud
upon any person. These acts are unlawful if done in connection with the purchase or sale of
a security.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(2) (1988). Remedies available under the federal securities laws are
generally more attractive than those available under state securities laws. However, the applicable statute of limitations may be more attractive under state law. See Sonnenschein, Federal
SecuritiesLaw Coverage of Note Transactions: The Antifraud Provisions, 35 Bus. LAW. 1567,
1578 (1980).
5. 110 S. Ct. 945, 948-55 (1990).

6. See Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 923
(1954); State v. Wiegel, 165 N.W.2d 695 (N.D. 1969). See generally Olympic Capital Corp. v.
Newman, 276 F. Supp. 646 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Prentice v. Hsu, 280 F. Supp. 384 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
7. 409 F.2d 989, 992 (1969).

8. While a participation interest and a promissory note are technically different entities
they have been treated functionally the same. See First Citizens Fed. Say. & Loan v. Worthen
Bank, 919 F.2d 510, 515 (9th Cir. 1990).
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was only intended for the protection of unsophisticated investors. 9 The Fifth
Circuit rejected this argument. The definition of a security in the 1934 Act
included "any note," declared the court, and the judiciary has interpreted
the definition in such a way that all notes are considered to be securities.' 0
Despite the holding in Lehigh Valley, other appellate courts began to
question the wisdom of treating all promissory notes as securities." These
courts reasoned that a literal reading may be inappropriate from a legislative
intent and public policy standpoint. Under this view, the antifraud provisions
of the federal securities laws were not intended to cover every note without
a consideration of how it originated. This view first received judicial rec2
ognition in Lino v. City Investing Co.'
In Lino, a lOb-5 action was instituted by a purchaser of a franchise sales
center license. The purchaser gave promissory notes and cash to the franchisor in return for the license. The Third Circuit characterized the notes
as commercial and not investment in nature because, according to the court,
it defied logic to assume that City Investing Company purchased Lino's
note and gave as payment a right to operate a franchise sales center. The
court held that the transaction did not involve the "sale" of a security
3
within the definition of sale under the 1933 Act.'
In concluding no "sale" had occurred, the court applied the "unless the
context otherwise requires" language to the definition of sale.' 4 The commercial context surrounding the issuance of the note required a finding of
no sale. Each of the definitional sections in the 1933 and 1934 Acts begin
with the words, "When used in this subchapter [or chapter], unless the
context otherwise requires . . . ." ' The court assumed, without stating, that
the "context clauses" authorize judicial exclusions on the basis of factual
circumstances, even if an instrument otherwise falls within the definition of
a "security."
The court never expressly stated that the note involved was not a security.
Rather, the narrow holding of the court was that there was no "sale" of
a security. However, the court's references to the definitional sections in
the Securities Acts indicate that it squarely confronted the literal reading
issue and rejected the policy favoring judicial recognition that every note is
6
a security.'
The court warned that a conclusion that every note is a security would
allow any consumer who bought an article and issued a note to sue in
federal court on the theory that the retailer purchased his security. The
9. Lehigh Valley, 409 F.2d at 990.

10. Id. at 992.
11. See generally Lipton & Katz, "Notes" Are (Are Not?) Always Securities-A Review,
29 Bus. LAw. 861 (1974).
12. 487 F.2d 689, 694-95 (3d Cir. 1973).
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1988). ("The term 'sale' or 'sell' shall include every contract
of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for value.").
14. Lino, 487 F.2d at 694.
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b, 78c(a) (1988). These phrases are referred to as the "context clauses."

16. Id.at 695.
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paucity of legislative history on this point indicated that Congress did not
intend such a result. The court concluded by admonishing that not
every
?
plan generating allegations of fraud violates federal securities law."
A.

The "Contet" Clause

The definitional sections in the 1933 and 1934 Acts begin with the words,
"When used in this subchapter [or chapter], unless the context otherwise
requires-the term 'security' means any note, stock, bond ... ."8 In Limo,
the court implied that the "context clauses" authorize the judiciary to
narrow the definition of "security" as the "economic realities" require. As
an appellate court has pointed out, however, the "context clauses" provide
no such authority.19
The most notable feature about the "context clauses" is that they do not
appear in the parag-raphs defining "security." Instead, these clauses precede
all fifteen definitions in the 1933 Act and all forty definitions in the 1934
Act. Plainly, the "context clauses" were not directed particularly at the
definitions of "'ecurity."20
Moreover, the Acts' legislative history does not suggest that the "context"
clauses were intended to exempt certain named securities from coverage. 2'
Neither the House nor the Senate reports make special references to the
clauses or indicate that special kinds of notes are embraced by the Act
"only when the context requires." If the drafters had intended that the
"context" clause exempt certain named securities from coverage, they made
no mention of it.22
Rather, early drafts of the proposed legislation show that the "context"
clauses refer to the context in which the defined words appear in the statute
itself.23 For example, the word "note" will be given its general definition
throughout the statute. However, there may be a particular usage of the
word, in a particular section, where the "context" of its usage within the
statutory language will require that a different definition be applied. 24
Lino applied the "context" clause directly to the definition of saleY
However, other courts have applied an alternative approach. These courts
apply the "context" clause directly to the definition of a security.2 They
17. Id.
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(1), 78c(a)(10) (1988).
19. See Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 330-31 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd on other
grounds, 471 U.S. 701 (1985).
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b, 78c(a) (1988).
21. Ruefenacht, 737 F.2d at 330.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 331.
24. Id.
25. Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 694 (3d Cir. 1973).
26. See, e.g., McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 930 (1975); Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
However, some state ccurts have rejected this approach. See, e.g., State v. Sheets, 94 N.M.
356, 610 P.2d 760 (Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 675, 615 P.2d 992 (1980); see also
Comment, CommercialNotes and the Definition of a 'Security' Under the Securities Exchange
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have analyzed the underlying context of a particular transaction to determine
its consumer or commercial characteristics. The end result of such analysis
would be a conclusion that some promissory notes issued in certain commercial or consumer transactions are not securities; therefore, the Securities
Acts would have no application.
The view espoused in Lino, that not all promissory notes should be
treated as securities, began to receive wide federal judicial recognition in
the early 1970s. A wide divergence of opinion developed as to what test
should be applied for determining when promissory notes are securities. The
four separate tests were developed by the courts of appeals. Each will be
discussed below briefly.
B. Investment Versus Commercial Test
The first of these tests is the investment versus commercial transaction
test. 27 Prior to Reves, most courts of appeals used the investment versus
commercial test. 28 Under this test a note issued in connection with an
investment type transaction is a security. A note issued in a commercialtype transaction is not a security. The focus is on the nature of the
transaction giving rise to the issuance of the note. 29
In Zabriskie v. Lewis,30 the Tenth Circuit formulated an eight factor test
to determine whether certain promissory notes possessed the characteristics
of "investment"3 or "ommercial" notes. "Investment" notes were considered securities. '
The factors identified by the Tenth Circuit are: (1) whether the issuer
used the proceeds to buy specific assets or services, rather than for general
financing; (2) the amount of risk, if any, to the initial investment; (3)
whether the payee is given certain rights; (4) whether repayment is contingent
on profits or production; (5) whether there are a large number of notes or
payees; (6) whether the dollar amount involved is large; (7) whether the
instruments are fixed-time notes rather than demand notes; and (8) the
32
parties' characterization of the note and the transaction.

Act of 1934: A Note is a Note is a Note?, 52 NEB. L. REv. 478 (1973); Comment, Notes as
Securities Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 MD.
L. REV. 233 (1976). But see Hammett, Any PromissoryNote: The Obscene Security-A Search
for the Non-Commercial Investment, 7 TEx. TECH L. REv. 25, 38-40 (1975).
27. While most of the lower federal courts describe this approach as the commercialinvestment dichotomy test, the Supreme Court, in Reves, refers to it as the investment versus
commercial test. For purposes of this note, investment versus commercial test will be used.
28. See, e.g., Futura Dev. Corp. v. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33, 40-41 (1st Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985); C.N.S. Enters. v. G. & G. Enters., 508 F.2d 1354, 1359 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 550-52 (10th Cir.
1974); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1111-14 (5th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing
Co., 487 F.2d 689, 693-96 (3d Cir. 1973).
29. See Lipton & Katz, "Notes" Are Not Always Securities, 30 Bus. LAw. 763 (1975).
30. 507 F.2d 546, 551 (10th Cir. 1974).
31. Id. at 551.
32. Id.
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This test has also been adopted in Oklahoma under the Oklahoma Securities Act.3 3 In State v. Hoephner,3 the Court of Criminal Appeals adopted
the eight-part Tenth Circuit test. In Hoephner, an unsophisticated investor
was approached with the prospect of investing her money and receiving a
high rate of return. She was given a promissory note, and she did not
receive any goods or services for her money. Applying the Zabriskie test,
the court ruled that under these facts the note in question was an "investa
ment" note and, therefore, a security."
Other state courts have rejected the investment versus commercial analysis.
State v. Sheets36' is an example of those courts which have rejected this
approach. In Sheets, the defendant was convicted of selling unregistered
securities. Those who gave money to the defendant received a promissory
note in return and were promised a stratospheric rate of interest over the
7
life of the note3
Relying on Zabriskie, the-defendant argued that notes are not "securities"
unless they can be characterized as investment notes under the investment
versus commercial test. The court rejected the defendant's argument and
chose not to adopt the investment versus commercial test. Instead, the court
ruled that any instrument coming within the statutory definition of a security
is a security. Since the phrase "any note" appears in the definition of a
security, the usual, ordinary meaning of "note" should apply. The documents issued by the defendant were notes and therefore, the court held,
'3
they were "securities.
C.

The Howey Test

The second test is the test for "investment contracts" created in SEC v.
W.J. Howey.3 9 The definition of a "security" includes "investment contracts."' 4 Both the Eighth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit have
applied the test for "investment contracts" to promissory notes. 41 The
Howey test defines an "investment contract" through the use of four
factors. First, there must be an investment of money. Second, the investment
must be in a common enterprise. Third, the investment must create a
reasonable expectation of profit. Fourth, the profit expected must be derived
solely from the efforts of others. 42
33.
34.
35.
36.

71 OKLA. STAT. § 1-827 (1981 & Supp. 1990).
574 P.2d 1079 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978).
Id. at 1083.
94 N.M. 356, 610 P.2d 760, 765 (1980), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 675, 615 P.2d 992

(1980).
37. Id., 610 P.2d at 763.
38. Id., 610 P.2d at 765.
39. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
40. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
41. See Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Arthur Young &
Co. v. Reeves, 856 F.2d 52, 53-55 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
42. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. The Supreme Court appears to have relaxed the "solely"
requirement. See United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975) ("reasonable
expectations of profits to be derived from the entreprenurial or management efforts of others").
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In Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 4 the Eighth Circuit applied the Howey
test to demand promissory notes issued by a farmer's cooperative (co-op).
The court did not give a reason for choosing the Howey test over the other
available tests." Nevertheless, the court concluded that45 the demand notes
were not securities because they failed the Howey test.
First, the co-op issued the notes in exchange for short-term loans with
fixed interest rates. The court ruled the transaction was more akin to a
commercial lending arrangement than an investment transaction. Thus, the
transaction failed the first element of the Howey test, which requires an
"investment" of money."
Moreover, the third element of the Howey test, reasonable expectation
of profit, was not satisfied. The court ruled that profit does not mean any
return beyond principal. Rather, profit under the Howey test means profit
of the type typically associated with an investment. This includes "capital
appreciation resulting from the development of the initial investment or a
participation in earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds." 47 The
demand noteholders did not participate in the co-op's earnings by virtue of
their ownership of the demand notes. There was also no prospect of capital
appreciation. Therefore, the court ruled, the demand noteholders did not
expect a profit as that term is used in Howey.48
D. Risk Capital Test
The third test is the "risk capital" test. The Ninth Circuit and the Sixth
Circuit have adopted the "risk capital" test which analogizes a note to an
"investment contract. '49 Under this test, the ultimate question is whether
the funding party contributed risk capital subject to the managerial efforts
of others.5 0 The underlying transaction must be examined to determine
whether it more closely resembles a "loan," making it a non-security, or
whether it has risk factors more closely associated with "risk capital,"
5
making it more appropriately a security. '
In applying the risk capital test, the Ninth Circuit looked at six factors,
none dispositive, to determine whether the funding party invested "risk
capital." These factors are: (1) the length of time between the note's issuance
43. 856 F.2d 52, 53-55 (8th. Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
44. Id. at 54. The court incorrectly stated the "Howey test defines a security .... ." Id.

Howey sets forth a test for defining "investment contracts," one of the items listed in the
definition of a security. The Howey test was never intended to be an all-encompassing definition

of a security.
45. Id.
46. Id.

47. Id.
48. Id. at 55. The Supreme Court, in Reves, ruled that profit in the context of notes
includes interest. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S. Ct. 945, 950-52 (1990).
49. See, e.g., Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1431 (9th Cir. 1985); American Bank &

Trust v. Wallace, 702 F.2d 93, 96 (6th Cir. 1983).
50. Underhill, 769 F.2d at 1431 (citing United California Bank v. THC Financial Corp.,
557 F.2d 1351, 1356-58 (9th Cir. 1977)).
51. Great W. Bank & Trust Co. v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1255 (9th Cir. 1976).
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and the due date; (2) whether there is collateral for the note; (3) the form
of the obligation; (4) the circumstances of the issuance; (5) the relationship
between the amount borrowed and the size2 of the borrower's business; and
(6) the contemplated use of the proceeds.1
The Ninth Circuit applied these factors in Great Western Bank & Trust
Co. v. Kotz, where a bank brought an action under the Securities Acts to
recover losses incurred on an unsecured note given in connection with a
loan agreement. The note was not renewable without the consent of the
lender and the loan agreement allowed the lender to declare default at the
faintest sign of insecurity. Based on these facts, the court ruled the note
was not a security.$3
E. The Family Resemblance Test
The fourth test is the "family resemblance" test developed by the Second
Circuit. After surveying the prior cases decided by other lower federal4
courts, the Second Circuit in Exchange National Bank v. Touche Ross1
decided the best alternative lay in greater recourse to the statutory language.
Looking to the plain language in the definitional sections, the Second Circuit
began with the presumption that any note with a term of more than nine
months is a "security." 5 Then, relying on the "context" clause, the court
concluded this presumption is rebuttable if the "context" of the transaction
indicates that a certain note is obviously not a security.5 6 The court, applying
a "family resemblance" test, then identified a list of instruments commonly
considered notes that should not be considered securities.57 Under this
portion of the test, the following "notes" are not to be considered securities:
the note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured by a
mortgage on a home, the short-term note secured by a lien on a
small business or some of its assets, the note evidencing a "character" loan to a bank customer, short-term notes secured by an
assignment of accounts receivable, or a note which simply formalizes an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course of
business (particularly if, as58 in the case of the customer of a
broker, it is collateralized).
An exception for "loans by commercial banks for current operations" was
subsequently added in Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co.59
52. Id. at 1258.
53. Id. at 1259-60.
54. 544 F.2d 1126, 1131-35, 1138 (2d Cir. 1976), modified, Chemical Bank v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1984).
55. Id. at 1137.

56. Id. at 1138. The court derives authority for examining the underlying "context" of a
transaction from the "unless the context otherwise requires" introductory clause preceding the
definitional sections in the Acts. See supra notes 18-24 for further discussion of this clause.
57. Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross, 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir. 1976).
58. Id.
59. 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984).
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The "family resemblance" test, therefore, permits an issuer to rebut the
presumption that a note is a security if the issuer can demonstrate that the
note in question closely resembles an item on the above judicially created
list of exceptions. 60 If a note does not bear a strong resemblance to one of
the instruments identified in the list, and it has a maturity exceeding nine
months, the Securities Acts 6 under the "family resemblance" test should
generally be held applicable. '
IM. Reves v. Ernst & Young
The issue of whether promissory notes should be treated as securities and,
if so, under what test finally reached the Supreme Court in Reves v. Ernst
& Young. 62 Reves focused on the nontraditional financing method employed
by a farmer's cooperative (co-op) located in Arkansas and Oklahoma to
raise money for its general business operations. 6 The scheme involved the
offer of uncollateralized and uninsured promissory notes. The notes were
payable on demand at a variable rate of interest adjusted monthly so that
the rate paid was always higher than the rate paid by other local financial
institutions. The note program was marketed as an "investment program,"
and was offered to both members and non-members. The note sales were
continuous for a number of years and were ongoing. However, no information regarding the co-op's financial status had ever been disclosed to
noteholders at the time of their purchases. The only financial information
available was a statement of the co-op's total assets, which appeared periodically in the co-op newsletter.
The co-op employed Arthur Young to audit and report the co-op's 1981
and 1982 financial statements."4 However, these audited financial statements
were never distributed to the co-op's members or the demand noteholders.
Except for the advertisements and placements in the co-op newsletter, the
only financial information about the co-op was disseminated at the co-op's
annual meetings.
In 1984, the co-op filed bankruptcy, leaving over 1,600 people holding
notes worth a total of $10 million. The noteholders filed a class action
lawsuit under Rule 10b-5 against Arthur Young. The suit alleged the accounting firm had committed securities fraud by overvaluing one of the coop's major assets. Although the plaintiffs prevailed in district court, 6 the
60. Chemical Bank, 554 F.2d at 1138.
61. Id.
62. 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990).
63. Id. at 947-48. At the time of the filing of the lawsuit the co-op, an agricultural
cooperative, had approximately 23,000 members. It charged only a nominal membership fee
to the farmer-members it served. For the most part, the co-op, prior to retaining the services
of Arthur Young in 1981, operated a "traditional" farmer's cooperative in northwest Arkansas
and northeast Oklahoma (i.e. it obtained the bulk of its operating funds from traditional
borrowing sources such as banks). Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52, 53 (8th Cir.
1988).
64. Id.at 948. Arthur Young was the predecessor to respondent Ernst & Young.
65. Robertson v. White, 635 F. Supp. 851 (W.D. Ark. 1986).
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Eighth Circuit reversed. As noted above, it did so on the basis that the
notes were not securities under the Howey test.6 The plaintiffs appealed to
the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.
A.

Treatment By The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the Reves notes by recognizing
that Congress' purpose in enacting the securities laws was to regulate
investments. 67 To achieve its goal of protecting investors, Congress defined
the term "security" broadly enough to include virtually any instrument that
might be sold as an investment. 6
Nonetheless, the Court emphasized that the securities laws are not intended
to provide a general federal cause of action for fraud. 69 The Court also
reiterated that in analyzing a particular transaction, the courts must look
to the economics of the transaction under investigation." Thus, a proper
analysis would go beyond the name given a particular transaction and
examine its underlying substance .7 In adopting this approach, the Court
simply recognized the analysis which the lower courts had been applying
for years - the Securities Acts' enumerative definitions should not be read
72
literally.
Turning to such analysis, the Court first considered and then rejected
applying the Landreth Timber v. Landreth formula to notes.7 3 The Court
also expressly rejected the reasoning of those circuits that had applied the
Howey test for "investment contracts." 7 4 It reasoned that though demand
notes may not be "investment contracts," this conclusion did not mean that
such notes could not be notes within the statutory definition of a security.75
The Court concluded that the various parts of the statutory definitions
would be superfluous if a promissory note could only be considered a
security when it satisfies a test for an entirely different variety of instrument,
such as "investment contracts." 76 Furthermore, it concluded that the appli66. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52, 53-55 (8th Cir. 1988). See supra notes 4348 and accompanying text.
67. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 949.
68. Id (citing United Housing Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975)).
69. Id. (citing Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982)).
70. Id. (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 950.
73. Id. (citing Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 692 (1985)). The Court
indicated in Landreth Timber that an instrument bearing the name stock will normally be
considered a security provided it is negotiable, offers the possibility of capital appreciation,
and carries the right to dividends. In Landreth Timber, the Court held that stock is always a
security if it has the economic characteristics traditionally associated with stock. Landreth
Timber, 471 U.S. at 687. Although the Court refused to rule out a similar per se rule for
notes, it intimated that such a rule would be unjustified. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 949.
74. Id. at 951; see supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text. The Court considered the
Ninth Circuit's "risk capital" test (described supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text) to be
virtually identical to the Howey test. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing Landreth Timber, 471 U.S. at 692).
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cation of the Howey test to notes would be inconsistent with Congress'
77
intent to regulate the entire body of instruments sold as investments.
The Court also rejected the Eighth Circuit's argument that the demand
characteristic of the notes is uncharacteristic of a security. 78 The Eighth
Circuit based its conclusion on the idea that instant liquidity is inconsistent
with the risks ordinarily associated with a security.7 9 In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that common stock, the paradigm of a security,
is even more readily liquid than demand notes. 0 The Court pointed out
that the demand feature only eliminates risk when and if payment is made,
whereas the sale of a share of stock through a national exchange and the
receipt of the proceeds usually occur simultaneously."
However, the Court did not expressly reject the investment versus commercial test. Instead, the Court viewed the investment versus commercial
and the family resemblance tests as two ways of stating the same general
approach."3
B. Supreme Court's Formulation of The "Family Resemblance" Test
After reviewing the four separate tests developed by the courts of appeals,
the Court selected the "family resemblance" test which, it felt, provided
the best framework for analysis.84 First, with very little discussion, analysis
or citation of authority, the Court accepted the Second Circuit's approach
of eliminating from coverage under the Securities Acts the above identified
seven categories of promissory notes. Realizing the difficulty an issuer or
maker of a note faces in trying to prove that a certain instrument resembles
one of the excepted items identified by the Second Circuit, the Court then
formulated four general factors for use in determining whether a note
resembles one of the enumerated categories of non-securities.8 5
The first factor examines the motivations prompting a reasonable seller
and buyer to enter into the transaction. The second factor examines the
plan of distribution of the instrument. The third factor considers the reasonable expectations of the investing public as to the application of the
Securities Acts to the transaction. The fourth factor addresses the existence
of another regulatory scheme which significantly reduces the risk of the
instrument, thereby rendering the protection of the federal securities laws
unnecessary. 6
77. Id.

78. Id. at 953.
79. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1988).
80. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 953.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 951.
83. Id.
84. Id. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text for further discussion of the "family
resemblance" test.
85. Id. The Court criticized the Second Circuit for not providing enough guidance as to
"what it is about those instruments that makes them 'non-securities."' Id.
86. Id. Under the first factor, "if the seller's purpose is to raise money for the general
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Thus, the first step. under the Reves test is to apply these four factors to
determine whether the note bears a strong family resemblance to a category
of non-securities oil the judicially created list of exceptions. If the note does
not resemble an existing category of non-securities, the courts then, in step
two of the Reves test, apply the same four factors to determine whether a
new category should be added to the list.87
Applying this analytical framework to the facts in Reves, the Court
concluded that the co-op's motive in selling the notes was to raise money
for general business operations."8 On the other hand, it stated that the
purchaser's motive in buying them was to earn a profit in the form of
interest at a rate constantly revised to keep it above the rate paid by local
banksA9 Accordingly, both sides considered the scheme as an investment in
a business enterprise rather than a commercial or consumer transaction.9'
The Court then examined the co-op's plan of distribution. It pointed out
that the notes were offered and sold to a broad segment of the public.
This, the Court felt, was all that was necessary to establish that there was
"common trading" in the instruments.9' As to the third point, the Court
felt that the public's reasonable expectations also lead to a conclusion that
the notes were securities. The notes were advertised as investments and no
other reasons existed to lead a reasonable person to conclude otherwiseY2

use of a business enterprise or to finance substantial investments and the buyer is interested
primarily in the profit the note is expected to generate, the instrument is likely to be a
'security."' Id. at 952. "If the note is exchanged to facilitate the purchase and sale of a minor
asset or consumer good, to correct for the seller's cash-flow difficulties, or to advance some
other commercial or consumer purpose, on the other hand, the note is less sensibly described
as a 'security."' Id. The Court cited Forman to illustrate a situation where the most common
form of security, stock, was purchased not for profit, but for an asset. Id. (citing United
Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975)). The Court held the stock not to be a
security because the purchasers bought the shares to acquire low cost apartments in a housing
cooperative. Id. at 952-53.
Under the second factor, the plan of distribution of the instrument, one should examine the
instrument to determine whether it is one in which there is "common trading for speculation
or investment." Id. at 952. All that is necessary to establish the requisite "common trading"
is an offering to a broad segment of the public. Id.
Under the third factor, the Court will consider instruments to be securities on the basis of
the public's expectations, even where an economic analysis of the circumstances of the particular
transaction might suggest that the instruments are not securities as used in the transaction. Id.
The fourth factor came to light in Marine Bank v. Weaver, where certificates of deposit were
held not to be securities because they were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
and subject to substantial regulation under the federal banking laws. Id. (citing Marine Bank
v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 557-59 (1982)). The risk reducing factor created by alternative
regulation was first reognized by the Court in Teamsters v. Daniel, where a pension plan was
held not to be a security because, among other reasons, it was comprehensively regulated
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Id. at 953 (citing Teamsters v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 569-70 (1979)).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 952.
89. Id. at 953.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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Lastly, the Court found no other state or federal regulatory scheme to
reduce the risk associated with the uncollateralized and uninsured notes. 93
The foregoing analysis convinced the Court that the demand notes fell
94
within the term "note" in section 3(a)10 of the 1934 Act.
IV. Case Law Applying Reves: Trends & Problems
A.

Has Reves Changed Anything?

Since the Reves decision a number of federal courts have been called
upon to apply the analysis it developed. A look at these new cases indicates
that little has changed as a result of Reves except the labels used.
The proposition that Reves has had little substantive impact is best
illustrated by the Tenth Circuit's analysis in Holloway v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co. (Holloway I1).95 The original Holloway opinion (Holloway
1) was decided prior to Reves. 96 While Holloway I was on appeal, the
Supreme Court issued the Reves decision. The Court then vacated Holloway
I and remanded it to the Tenth Circuit for reconsideration in light of
Reves. 97
After the Supreme Court remanded Holloway I, the Tenth Circuit issued
Holloway II, which reaffirmed in all respects its original decision." The
court recognized that it had essentially performed the Reves analysis in
Holloway L 99 This was evidenced by the fact that the Reves test analyzed
the same facts as the Zabriskie eight factor investment versus commercial
test applied in Holloway L Reves factor one, the motivations of the buyer
and seller in exchanging the instrument, is closely related to Zabriskie factors
one and four.100 Reves factor two, the instrument's plan of distribution, is
analyzed under Zabriskie factors five and six. 01 Reves factor three, the
reasonable expectations of the investing public, is analyzed under Zabriskie
factor eight. 02
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 900 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1990).
96. Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 879 F.2d 772, 774-78 (10th Cir. 1989)
(Holloway 1).
97. Peat Marwik Main & Co. v. Holloway, 110 S. Ct. 1314 (1990).
98. Holloway II, 900 F.2d at 1487-88.
99. Id. at 1487. In Holloway I, the Tenth Circuit applied the eight factor investment versus
commercial test set forth in Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 551 n.9 (10th Cir. 1974).
Applying the eight-factor test, the court ruled that the thrift certificates and passbook savings
certificates were investment, not commercial, instruments. Holloway II, 900 F.2d at 1488-89.
Investment instruments are considered securities. Id.
100. Holloway II, 900 F.2d at 1488. Zabriskie factor one asks whether the proceeds were
used to buy specific assets or services rather than general financing. Zabriskie, 507 F.2d 551
n.9. Zabriskie factor four looks at whether repayment is contingent on profit or production.
Id.
101. Id. The fifth and sixth Zabriskie factors are the large number of notes or payees and
the large dollar amount, respectively. Id.
102. Id. Zabriskie factor eight examines the characterization given the transaction by the
parties themselves.
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The major analytical difference between Reves and Holloway lies in the
treatment of other federal regulatory schemes. 10 The issuers in Holloway I
were subject to regulation under the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA),
a federal statute. 1' 4 However, the Tenth Circuit concluded the BHCA did
not satisfy the disclosure and remedial purposes of the Securities Acts. The
BHCA's purpose was to protect bank depositors, not investors in the holding
company's nonbank subsidiaries. 15 Nevertheless, in Holloway I the court
stated that even if an instrument qualified as a security under the investment
versus commercial test, other federal regulation might still remove the
instrument from the protection of the federal securities laws.'4 6
In Holloway II, the Tenth Circuit recognized that Reves alters the original
Holloway I analysis.'07 The existence of some other regulatory scheme that
significantly reduces the risk of the instrument is now one of four factors
used to determine whether the instrument is or should be categorized as a
non-security. The Tenth Circuit recognized that this change in emphasis did
not affect the outcome of the case. 108
The only other appellate case applying Reves arose in the Ninth Circuit.
In First Citizens Savings & Loan Association v. Worthen Bank, 1 9 a savings
and loan association that entered into a loan participation agreement sued
the principal lender, a commercial bank, seeking rescission. The note underlying the loan participation agreement evidenced a loan by the bank to
a developer to finance a development project. Under Arizona law, if the
note underlying the loan participation is a security, then the loan participation agreement is a security.
The Ninth Circuit formerly applied the "risk capital" test in determining
whether a note wa3 a security." 0 The court noted, however, that Reves
rejected this test in favor of the Second Circuit's "family resemblance"
test. Under this test, the court found that "a note evidencing a loan made
by a commercial bank to finance current operations of a borrower" was
part of the judicial list of exceptions to the general rule that all notes are
securities. In First Citizens, the note underlying the agreement evidenced a
loan by a commerciad bank to a developer to finance one of his development
projects. As such, the court ruled that it fit squarely into the exception and
did not constitute a "security" under federal law."'
103. Id. The impoitarce of alternative federal regulatory schemes was articulated by the
Supreme Court in Matin. Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982). In Marine Bank, the Court
ruled that if instruments that might otherwise qualify as securities were covered by another
federal regulatory scheme, the protection provided by the federal securities laws would be
unnecessary. Marine BankI, 455 U.S. at 558-59.
104. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988).
Both the trust company and finance company were subsidiaries of a bank holding company.
105. Reves, 879 F.2d at 786.
106. Id.
107. Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 900 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990)
(Holloway fl).
108. Id.
109. 919 F.2d 510, 515 (9th Cir. 1990).
110. Id.
11. Strict adherence to Reves would require the Ninth Circuit to apply the four factors,
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Though the Supreme Court in Reves expressly rejected the "risk capital"

approach, the result in First Citizens would have been the same. The note
underlying the loan participation was given in exchange for a commercial
loan. The transaction was purely private, and the terms were negotiated
between a commercial lender and borrower. None of the risk factors associated with "risk capital" were present."12 Like Holloway, First Citizens
indicates that Reves has only changed the terms used, not the result.
B.

The Exception For Mortgage Backed Notes

It is not clear from Reves whether the exception for "note[s] secured by
a mortgage on a home" only applies to the traditional loan arrangement
between borrower and lender."' Reves did not define the scope of this
definition. As a result, an argument was made in Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider,
Raitt & Heuer, P.C., that mortgage backed home equity promissory notes
marketed by a broker-dealer to the general public fall squarely within the
"note secured by a mortgage on a home" exception."

4

The defendants

which it did not do, to determine whether the note at issue resembles one of the categories.
However, the court obviously saw no reason to apply the four factors because the note
underlying the participation agreement was the same type of note referred to in the category.
112. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
113. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S. Ct. 945, 951 (1990).
114. 736 F. Supp. 764, 769-70 (W.D. Mich. 1990), aff'd, 931 F.2d 893 (6th Cir.) (unpublished
opinion), aff'd, 933 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished opinion). The "note secured by a
mortgage on a home category" was at issue in Singer v. Livoti, 741 F. Supp. 1041, 1049-50
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). In Singer, the plaintiffs loaned money, on advice of their defendant-attorney,
to a developer who gave them a promissory note. To secure payment, the developer executed
and delivered a mortgage on eighteen building lots. The mortgage was never recorded, and
the developer failed to repay the note.
The court concluded that the promissory note was not a security because it resembled the
"note secured by a mortgage on a home" category of notes which are not securities. Id. at
1049. The court recognized the note at issue in Singer was not secured by a mortgage on a
home but by a mortgage on a number of homes. Id. However, the court did not see this as
a problem. The note was issued in a commercial lending context through the conduit of a
lawyer. Today, a substantial number of conventional mortgage loans are made by private
individuals with the aid of knowledgeable intermediaries such as lawyers and real estate brokers.
Id. It is hard to see, the court wondered, why an exception for a conventional real estate
mortgage should be different simply because it covered "a home" rather than an office
building, a series of homes or vacant land. Id.
Diaz Vicente v. Obenauer, 736 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Va. 1990), is the only other federal
district case, as of this writing, applying Reves. The plaintiffs in Obenauerinvested money in
a real estate project pursuant to participation agreements. A subsequent letter from the
defendants confirmed modifications to the participation agreements. The defendants used the
money for personal expenses and never repaid the principal or interest.
The court viewed the letter as a promissory note and, accordingly, applied the Reves analysis.
Id. at 693. It concluded that the letter in no way resembled any of the nonsecurity notes
enumerated in Reves. Id.
One state court of appeals and two state supreme courts have held that Reves applies to
state securities laws. This is not surprising considering the definition of a security in most state
securities acts is virtually identical to the federal definition.
In Caucus Distribs. v. Department of Commerce, 793 P.2d 1048 (Alaska 1990), and Caucus
v. Maryland Sec. Comm'r, 320 Md. 313, 577 A.2d 783 (1990), securities commissioners from
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pointed to this language in arguing the mortgage backed notes were per se
not securities.
The court correctly rejected this mechanical interpretation of the "note
secured by a mortgage on a home" category." 5 This language was meant
to apply only to mortgage backed notes given in the context of a traditional
face-to-face loan transaction between a borrower and a commercial or
consumer lender. The non-security status of "the note secured by a mortgage
on a home" was not intended to apply to transactions between an individual
investor and a broker-dealer selling the mortgage backed notes on a mass
market basis." 6 This conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court's
directives in Reves.
In Reves, the Court exempted certain notes issued in a consumer or
commercial context from coverage under the Securities Acts. A look at the
seven categories of notes that are not securities shows that they all have
commercial characteristics." 7 The mortgage backed notes at issue in Mercer
had all the characteristics of an investment. Thus, even though they fell
within the literal language of the exception, they were clearly not the type
of routine commercial arrangements excluded from coverage under Reves.
C.

Weighing The Four Factors

A recent federal district court case illustrates one of the problems with
the Reves opinion. In Reves, the Supreme Court did not set forth the
relative weights of the four factors. It is unclear from Reves what the result
would be where some of the factors lead to a conclusion that the instrument
at issue should be considered a security while the other factors point in the
opposite direction. This dilemma is vividly illustrated in Fulton Bank v.
McKittrick & Briggs Securities."'
The defendants in Fulton Bank agreed to construct and lease a laundry
facility to a municipality. The defendants were short of funds, and consequently they enlisted the help of a broker-dealer who sold a "Certificate of
Participation" in the right to receive lease payments to the bank." 9 Payments

Alaska and Maryland i.sued cease and desist orders directing that Caucus Distributors, a
Lyndon LaRouche organization, stop issuing uninsured and uncollateralized promissory notes
in exchange for contributions to its political fundraising activities. The highest courts of both
Maryland and Alaska ruled the notes were securities under Reves. Caucus Distribs., 793 P.2d
at 1056; Maryland Securities, 577 A.2d at 791.
In State v. Saas, 58 Wash. App. 305, 792 P.2d 554 (1990), the Washington court of appeals
reversed a plea of guilty to securities fraud. The basis for the court's decision was that the
notes given by the defendants were not securities under Reves. Id., 792 P.2d at 555-58.
115. Mercer, 736 F. Supp. at 769.
116. Id.
117. See supra note 5:-59 and accompanying text.
118. Nos. 88-0144, 88-0882, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11371 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 1990)
(unpublished opinion).
119. The bank was led to believe the lease payments were tax exempt. In fact, the interest
component of the lease payments was not tax exempt.
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to the bank eventually ceased, leaving over one million dollars outstanding.' 20
Applying the Reves four-factor test, the court concluded the participation
interest did not resemble any of the six categories of notes which are not

securities.' 21 Therefore, the participation interest was a security. However,

an analysis of the underlying facts sheds some doubt on the court's conclusion.
The Fulton Bank opinion clearly indicates that the defendants' motive in

selling participation interests in the right to receive lease payments was to
correct short-term cash flow difficulties. The Supreme Court made clear in

Reves that, under factor one, if the seller's purpose in soliciting funds is to
correct short-term cash flow problems, the instrument is likely not to be a
security. Yet the court overlooked this aspect of the test.
A look at Reves factor two, the plan of distribution, indicates there was

no such plan. The participation interest was sold from one broker-dealer to
another broker-dealer, and ultimately resold to the bank. The requisite
"common trading" in the instrument was not met.
However, Reves factor three, the reasonable expectations of the investing

public, indicates the certificate was a security. The financial community
regards this type of instrument as an investment security. The Securities

and Exchange Commission takes the position that participation interests in
tax exempt lease purchase agreements are "municipal securities" subject to
the rules of the Municipal Securities Rule-Making Board.lu Reves factor
four also indicated the certificate was a security. There was no alternative
regulatory scheme which reduced the risk of the investment.
Thus, Reves factors one and two indicated the participation interest was
not a security, while Reves factors three and four indicated otherwise. The
problem is that Reves does not set forth the relative weight to be given
each of the four factors. It is unclear whether one factor can lead to adding
an instrument to the list of non-securities if the other factors point in the
opposite direction. The practicing lawyer and judge are left with very little
guidance when confronted with a close case. Nevertheless, the court in
Fulton Bank ruled the perceptions of the financial community supported
the argument that the participation interest was a security. Without so
stating, the court relied exclusively on Reves factor three in reaching .the
conclusion it did.
V. Conclusion
In Reves, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve a dispute among the
courts of appeals as to what test should be applied for determining when
120. The municipality was unaware of the assignment of payments under the LPSA to the
bank. Eventually, the municipality exercised its option to purchase the laundry facility. Fulton
Bank, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11371, at *6.
121. Before applying the Reves analysis the court determined the "Certification of Participation" was similar to a note. The certificate entitled the bank to regular monthly payments
consisting of principal and interest. As such, the certificate closely resembled a note. Id., 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11371, at *12-13.
122. 2 Municipal Sec. Rule-Making Board Rep. 13 (Jan. 1982).
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notes are securities. Though the Court adopted the Second Circuit's family
resemblance test, the case law applying Reves indicates not much has
changed except the labels used. The Tenth Circuit in Holloway reached the
same result under the investment versus commercial test as it did under the
Reves version of the family resemblance test. Since prior to Reves, most
courts of appeals used the investment versus commercial test, Holloway
would indicate Reves will have little impact in those circuits. Moreover,
First Citizens indicates Reves should not change the outcome in the Ninth
Circuit and the Sixth Circuit, which formerly applied the "risk capital"
test. While these cases reveal Reves will have minimal substantive impact,
other cases bring to light problems with the Reves analysis.
One of the problems the practicioner confronts in applying Reves is
illustrated in Fulton Bank. In Fulton Bank two of the Reves factors indicated
the participation interest was a security while the other two factors indicated
otherwise. Nowhere in Reves does the Supreme Court set forth the relative
weight to be given each of the four factors. It is unclear whether one factor
can lead to adding an instrument to the list of non-securities if the other
factors point in the opposite direction. The practicing lawyer and judge are
left with very little guidance when confronted with a close case.
John Scribner
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